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CAMPBELL LEITH
SIMON WREN-LEWIS
Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model
Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian mod-
els suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random
walk. In this paper we consider the nature of the time inconsistency in-
volved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policymaking.
We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to
utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change
the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this
temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt
is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit
debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a se-
ries of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize
the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of
the debt stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing
debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for
discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment pol-
icy by considering a quasi-commitment policy, which allows for different
probabilities of reneging on past promises.
JEL codes: E62, E63
Keywords: New Keynesian model, government debt, monetary policy, fiscal policy, credibility.
IN STICKY-PRICE NEW KEYNESIAN models where social welfare
is derived from consumers’ utility, Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that optimal steady-state debt follows a random walk
when policymakers can commit to a time-inconsistent monetary and fiscal policy. In
this paper we analyze the nature of the time inconsistency involved and show that
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the implications of optimal (time-consistent) discretionary policy for debt are quite
different. This result has particular empirical relevance today as governments assess
the extent to which they need to reverse the large increases in debt caused by the
recession, in a context where fiscal policy commitments are often far from credible.
Much of the previous work examining time-consistency problems involving debt
has been based on flexible price models, where the issues are very different. Lucas and
Stokey (1983) identify three possibilities depending of the initial value of nominal
government debt. If debt is positive, the optimal policy is to raise the price level to
infinity to deflate the real value of debt. If the initial level of government liabilities is
negative, then monetary policy should be consistent with a price level that ensures the
government purchases can be financed without recourse to any distortionary taxation.
The “only possibility . . . of potential practical interest” (Lucas and Stokey, p. 83) is
the case where there is, in the initial period, no outstanding government debt, such
that the price level cannot be costlessly manipulated to achieve welfare gains. It is
only to the extent that the surprise inflation cannot costlessly and instantaneously be
used to manipulate the real value of the debt stock that a potential time-inconsistency
problem exists. In light of this, the flexible-price literature makes the discretionary
policy problem interesting either by assuming an ad hoc cost of inflation in the
policymaker’s objective function (see, e.g., Obstfeld 1991, 1997) or by introducing a
welfare cost to actual inflation through a device such as a cash-in-advance constraint,
where money is considered to be a predetermined variable. For example, when
monetary injections cannot be fully spent in the period in which they occur (Nicolini
1998), time-consistent policy may actually result in surprise deflations rather than
inflations. This and other papers show that the desired long-run level of debt under the
time-consistent policy may actually be positive or negative, depending on preferences
and whether or not monetary policy follows the Friedman rule (see, e.g., Ellison and
Rankin 2007, Diaz-Gimenex et al. 2008, Martin 2009).1
In this paper we focus on the time-consistency of policies where the costs of
inflation arise from nominal inertia rather than monetary transaction frictions. The
results in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that even a “miniscule” degree of
price stickiness means that it ceases to be optimal (under a Ramsey policy) to use
surprise inflation in the manner described by Lucas and Stokey (1983). As a result,
it may be thought that the time-inconsistency problem in a sticky-price environment
may be slight. Our results later show that this is not the case. Our analysis of the
time-inconsistency problem under sticky prices reveals that governments following
the optimal time-inconsistent policy are tempted to utilize policy instruments to
modify the level of debt in the initial period. For a shock that raises debt, we show
that the time-inconsistent policy will cut interest rates and government spending in
1. In all these papers the policymaker faces an intertemporal problem in deciding how to allocate
distortions over time—since inflation is assumed to be costly due to some kind of cash-in-advance
constraint, there is a cost in deflating the real value of debt through inflation surprises such that they
must decide to what extent they are willing to trade off such short-term distortions against the distortions
caused by having to deal with government debt in the future. Time-consistent policy is such that these
intertemporal effects are balanced until there are no incentives, in the absence of new information, to
generate additional policy surprises to alter the equilibrium paths of inflation and government debt.
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the initial period relative to their new steady-state levels (movements in tax rates
are ambiguous), which raises output and inflation. This occurs whether debt is real
or nominal. We show analytically and in simulation that under (time-consistent)
discretionary policy, debt will always be returned to its initial (efficient) steady state to
eliminate this temptation, and debt no longer follows a random walk. The instruments
used to stabilize debt under a discretionary policy depend crucially on the degree of
nominal inertia and the size of the debt stock, and for plausible debt–GDP ratios
and degrees of price stickiness, monetary policy will often bear the greatest burden
of fiscal adjustment. In contrast to ongoing fiscal consolidation efforts (International
Monetary Fund [IMF] 2012), cuts in government spending are not used heavily in
reducing debt levels under optimal discretionary policy.
We also show that the optimal discretionary (time-consistent) policy can involve
a very rapid correction to debt after a shock. Partly as a consequence, the welfare
consequences of allowing for debt without lump-sum taxes can be significant for
discretionary policy, particularly compared to commitment policies. In adding debt
to a New Keynesian model, the problem with discretionary policy (relative to com-
mitment) is not that it fails to stabilize the debt stock, but that it is overzealous in
doing so.
These large differences between discretionary and commitment policies emphasize
the importance of the sustainability of commitment. The costs and benefits of cheating
with debt policy are rather different from the more familiar inflationary bias example,
because the benefits to cheating come from reduced debt levels in the future rather
than a contemporaneous output gain. We show using the notion of quasi- (Schaumburg
and Tambalotti 2007), loose (Debertoli and Nunes 2010), or limited (Himmels and
Kirsanova 2013) commitment, that relatively modest degrees of policy credibility, as
measured by an exogenous probability that the policymaker will not abandon their
commitment plan, can bring us close to achieving the welfare levels achieved under
commitment.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we outline our model in
which consumers supply labor to imperfectly competitive firms that are only able to
change prices following random intervals of time. Worker’s labor income is taxed. In
Section 2, we derive a second-order approximation to welfare for these consumers.
This is important since the effective rejection of the Friedman rule in sticky-price
models relies on the dominance of the welfare costs of price distortions relative to the
costs reducing the inflation tax. In Section 3, we describe the optimal precommitment
policy and analyze the time inconsistency inherent in that policy, before computing
the discretionary policy in Section 4. This then informs the simulation results in
Section 5, which reveal that operating under discretion overturns the usual random
walk result and can potentially generate significant welfare costs. Section 6 then
assesses the robustness of our key results when considering the case of an inefficient
steady state, as well as alternative parameterizations. Finally, Section 7 considers the
case of quasi-commitment as a means of evaluating what degree of commitment is
required to mitigate the welfare costs associated with discretionary policy. Section 8
concludes.
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1. THE MODEL
Our model is a standard New Keynesian model, but augmented to include the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint where government spending is financed by distortionary
taxation and/or borrowing. This basic setup is similar to that in Benigno and Wood-
ford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) but with some differences. First, we
allow for the possibility that the government will vary government spending in the
face of shocks in an optimal way, rather than simply treating government spending
as an exogenous flow, which must be financed. We feel that it is important to allow
government spending to, potentially, contribute to debt stabilization policy since cur-
rent fiscal consolidation efforts rely heavily on government spending cuts (see IMF
2012) and the macroeconomic consequences of spending cuts can be quite different
from tax increases, even if the direct fiscal consequences are similar.2 Second, we
consider discretionary and quasi-commitment policies. In order to do so, for most
of the paper, we set aside the usual inflationary bias caused by an inefficiently low
level of steady-state output due to imperfect competition and distortionary taxes. This
is achieved through a steady-state subsidy (financed by lump-sum taxation), which
renders our steady state efficient and implies that the policymaker has no incentive
to increase output above its steady-state level.3
We utilize this steady-state subsidy as it enables us to formulate a valid linear-
quadratic (LQ) approximation to the underlying policy problem (see Woodford 2003,
chap. 6 for a discussion), which in turn supports the derivation of some analytical
results. It should be noted that there are alternative devices for eliminating the desire
to boost output above its steady-state level from the description of the policy problem
under discretion/quasi-commitment. For example, in developing optimal policy algo-
rithms as part of the DYNARE project, Levine and Pearlman (2011) simply assume
that the policymaker can commit to target the Ramsey steady state, even although
that steady state may be inefficient, but that the same policymaker cannot commit to
how they will respond to shocks that push the economy away from that steady state.
Differently, Levine et al. (2008) balance a consumption habits’ externality against
the distortions due to taxation and monopolistic competition to render the steady
state near efficient, which could be applied to our setup provided the externality was
based on current per capita consumption rather than lagged consumption to avoid
introducing additional dynamics. Finally, Bilbiie et al. (2008) note that a steady-state
tax on leisure could restore efficiency without requiring a lump-sum tax-financed
2. Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013) consider the impact of a realized fiscal consolidation being based on
spending cuts rather than tax increases, when, ex ante, there is uncertainty over the composition of state-
dependent fiscal consolidations. They show that this can determine whether or not a particular consolidation
is expansionary and/or successful in terms of reducing debt levels. More generally, the empirical literature
assessing the consequences of observed fiscal consolidations often stresses the importance of identifying
the composition of any fiscal adjustment (see, e.g., Alesina and Ardagna 2010).
3. We assume that policymakers do not have access to lump-sum taxes outside of the steady state, such
that monetary policy, distortionary taxes, and/or government spending must adjust to stabilize government
debt following shocks with fiscal consequences.
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subsidy. Any reader uncomfortable with our use of a steady-state subsidy should note
that these alternative modeling devices would lead to isomorphic policy problems to
the ones we analyze.
Alternatively, we could have used higher order perturbation methods to analyze the
time-consistent solution as in Klein, Krusell, and Rios Rull (2008) and Martin (2009).
As discussed in Klein, Krusell, and Rios Rull, the problem with such methods lies
in obtaining the steady state of the time-consistent solution to the nonlinear policy
problem, around which to approximate the economy. The steady-state subsidy, which
renders our economy efficient, implies that there is no time-inconsistency problem
associated with debt in our initial steady state, which we can describe analytically
before log-linearizing our economy. A second alternative would have been to use
global projection methods (see Heer and Maussner 2009, chaps. 5 and 6 for a survey)
to analyze the nonlinear policy problem. However, the richness of our sticky-price
economy (which would contain government debt, price dispersion and the shock
processes as state variables) would make such an approach prohibitively complex,
particularly given our goal of contrasting the discretionary, commitment, and quasi-
commitment solutions.4
1.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one. We shall assume full asset
markets, such that through risk sharing, they will face the same budget constraint. As
a result the typical household will seek to maximize the following objective function,
E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
(
C1−σt
1 − σ + χ
G1−σt
1 − σ −
Nt 1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
, (1)
where Ct , Gt , and Nt are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and labor
supply, respectively, where the private and public consumption goods aggregates are
defined as Ct = (
∫ 1
0 C( j)
−1

t d j)

−1 and Gt = (
∫ 1
0 G( j)
−1

t d j)

−1 , respectively, with
an elasticity of substitution between goods of different varieties given by  > 1.
Optimization of expenditure across individual goods implies the household’s demand
function for good j, C( j)t = ( P( j)tPt )−Ct with an associated price level of Pt =
(∫ 10 P( j)1−t d j) 11− .
The budget constraint at time t is given by
Pt Ct + Et Qt,t+1 Dt+1 = t + Dt + Wt Nt (1 − τt ) − Tt , (2)
4. Anderson, Kim, and Yun (2010) and Wolman and Zandweghe (2010) recently extend the projection
approach to the benchmark New Keynesian sticky-price economy under discretionary monetary policy,
but without the presence of government debt as a state variable. Niemann, Pichler, and Sorger (2008)
consider the case of discretion with government debt. Modeling the commitment and quasi-commitment
solutions using such techniques would increase the size of the state vector even further.
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where Dt+1 is the nominal payoff of the portfolio held at the end of period t , t is
the representative household’s share of profits in the imperfectly competitive firms,
Wt are wages, τt is an wage income tax rate, and Tt are lump-sum taxes. Qt,t+1 is the
stochastic discount factor for one-period-ahead nominal payoffs.
We can then maximize utility (i) subject to the budget constraint and (ii) to obtain
the optimal allocation of consumption across time,
βRt Et
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ ( Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1, (3)
where Rt = 1Et {Qt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one-period bond paying off a
unit of currency in t + 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler equation, which
implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time such that
the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after allowing for tilting
due to interest rates differing from the households’ rate of time preference).
A log-linearized version of (3) can be written as
Ĉt = Et {Ĉt+1} − 1
σ
(rt − Et {πt+1}), (4)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady state, rt = Rt − ρ,
where ρ = 1
β
− 1, and πt = ln(Pt/Pt−1) is price inflation.
The second first-order condition (FOC) relates to their labor supply decision and
is given by
(1 − τt ) (wt ) = Nϕt Cσt , (5)
where real wages are defined as wt = Wt/Pt . This expression log-linearizes as
− τ
1 − τ τ̂t + ŵt = ϕ N̂t + σ Ĉt . (6)
1.2 Firms
The production function is linear, so for firm j
Y ( j)t = At N ( j)t , (7)
where at = ln(At ) is time varying and stochastic, while the demand curve they face
is given by
Y ( j)t =
(
P( j)t
Pt
)−
Yt ,
where Yt = [
∫ 1
0 Y ( j)
−1

t d j]

−1 = Ct + Gt , after assuming the government attempts
to minimize the costs of obtaining a given level of public consumption by allocating
CAMPBELL LEITH AND SIMON WREN-LEWIS : 1483
expenditure across individual goods in the same manner as households. The objective
function of the firm is given by
∞∑
s=0
(θp)s Qt,t
[
P( j)t Y ( j)t − Wt Y ( j)t (1 − κ)At
]
, (8)
where θp is the probability that the firm is unable to change its price in a particular
period, and κ is a time-invariant employment subsidy that can be used to eliminate
the steady-state distortion associated with monopolistic competition and distortionary
income taxes. Profit maximization then implies that firms that are able to change price
in period t will select the following price:
P∗t =
∑∞
s=0(θp)s Qt,t
[
Wt Pt
Yt
At
]
∑∞
s=0(θp)s Qt,t
[( − 1)Pt Yt (1 − κ)] .
Log-linearization of this pricing behavior implies a New Keynesian Phillips curve
for price inflation which is given by
πt = βEtπt+1 + γ (mct ),
where γ = (1−θpβ)(1−θp)
θp
, mct = −at + ŵt are the real log-linearized marginal costs
of production.
1.3 Equilibrium
Goods market clearing requires, for each good j ,
Y ( j)t = C( j)t + G( j)t , (9)
which allows us to write
Yt = Ct + Gt ,
where aggregate output is defined as Yt = [
∫ 1
0 Y ( j)
−1

t d j]

−1
. Log-linearizing implies
Ŷt = θĈt + (1 − θ )Ĝt ,
where we define θ = CY .
1.4 Government Budget Constraint
Noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output,
Pt Yt = Wt Nt + t − κWt Nt ,
and the definition of aggregate demand, we can map the consumer’s flow budget
constraint, (2), to that of the government as
Tt + Wt Nt (τt − κ) + Qt,t+1 Dt+1 = Dt + Pt Gt − Tt , (10)
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where the net value of the households’ portfolio at time t is Dt = Rt−1 Bt−1 and where
Bt−1 is the stock of government bonds at the end of period t − 1 and Rt−1 is the
risk-free nominal interest rate.
With borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes, the sequential series of
budget constraints gives the intertemporal budget constraint (see Woodford 2003,
chap. 2, p. 69). In order to focus on the time-inconsistency problem associated with
the introduction of debt and distortionary taxation to the New Keynesian model we
follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and later authors and introduce a steady-state
subsidy.5 This subsidy offsets, in steady state, the distortions caused by distortionary
taxation and imperfect competition in price setting, and removes the usual desire on
the part of policymakers to raise output above its natural level to compensate for these
distortions. In other words, this subsidy ensures that the steady state is efficient. The
steady-state subsidy is financed by lump-sum taxation. We shall assume that both the
level of the subsidy and the associated level of lump-sum taxation cannot be altered
from this steady-state level, so that any changes in the government’s budget constraint
have to be financed by changes in distortionary taxation, government spending, or
debt service costs.6 This implies that WT NTκ = TT in our economy at all points in
time, allowing us to simplify the budget constraint to
Wt Ntτt + Bt = Rt−1 Bt−1 + Pt Gt − Tt . (11)
Defining real debt as bt ≡ Bt−1 Rt−1Pt−1 and its initial steady state by
b = wNτ − G
1 − β ,
we can log-linearize the government’s flow budget constraint around this steady state,
assuming a steady-state gross inflation rate of 1 and replacing the interest rate with
the consumption Euler equation, (4), yields
b̂t − πt − σ Ĉt = βEt {̂bt+1 − πt+1 − σ Ĉt+1} (12)
+
[
−σ (1 − β)Ĉt + wNτb (ŵt + N̂t + τ̂t ) −
G
b
Ĝt
]
,
as in Benigno and Woodford (2003). The next section defines the steady-state ratios
contained in this log-linearization as a function of model parameters and the initial
steady-state debt–GDP ratio.
5. Although hardly realistic, this setup allows us to focus attention in the time inconsistency involved
in debt policy, under varying degrees of commitment. We discuss alternative approaches to analyzing the
policy problem in the introduction to Section 1, and partially relax this assumption in Section 6.1.
6. If we considered the lump-sum financed subsidy to be a policy instrument, which could be varied
over time, then there would be no trade-off between fiscal solvency and business cycle stabilization, and
the policy problem would be rendered trivial.
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2. POLICY OBJECTIVES
In order to derive a welfare function for policy analysis we proceed in the following
manner. First, we consider the social planner’s problem. We then contrast this with
the outcome under flexible prices in order to determine the level of the steady-state
subsidy required to ensure the model’s initial steady state is socially optimal.7 Finally,
we construct a quadratic approximation to utility in our sticky-price/distortionary tax
economy, which assesses the extent to which endogenous variables differ from the
efficient equilibrium due to the nominal inertia and tax distortions present in the
model. We then recast our model in terms of the “gap” variables contained within
our welfare metric.
2.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner is not constrained by the price mechanism and simply maximizes
the representative household’s utility, (1), subject to the technology, (7), and resource
constraint, (9). This yields the following FOCs:
(C∗t )−σ = χG∗t −σ ,
(C∗t )−σ − Y ∗ϕt A−(1+ϕ)t = 0,
where we introduce the “*” superscript to denote the efficient level of that variable
implying the efficient level of output is given by
Y ∗t = (At )
1+ϕ
σ+ϕ (1 + χ 1σ ) σσ+ϕ ,
which log-linearizes as
Ŷ ∗t =
(
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ
)
at = Ĉ∗t = Ĝ∗t .
2.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium
Profit-maximizing behavior implies that firms will operate at the point at which
marginal costs equal marginal revenues,
− ln(μt ) = mct ,(
1 − 1

)
= (1 − κ)(1 − τt ) (N
n
t )(ϕ) A−1t (Cnt )σ .
7. We shall assume that this subsidy is in place throughout most of the paper. However, in Section 6
we shall explore the robustness of our results to relaxing this assumption. We do so by considering the
case where the subsidy is insufficient to replicate the efficient allocation in the initial steady state, such
that output is suboptimally low due to tax and monopolistic competition distortions.
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By choosing the steady-state subsidy, κ, to optimally offset the distortions due to
taxation and monopolistic competition,
(1 − κ) =
(
1 − 1

)
(1 − τ ), (13)
we obtain a flexible price steady state, which, assuming a steady-state government
spending rule, GY = (1 + χ−
1
σ )−1, is identical to the optimal level of employment in
the efficient steady state chosen by the social planner,
Y = N = (1 + χ 1σ ) σσ+ϕ = Y ∗.
This is turn defines the steady-state real wage, w = 11−τ , the steady-state tax rate
required to support a given debt-to-GDP ratio,
τ = (1 − β)
B
Y + GY
1 + (1 − β) BY + GY
,
and the ratio of tax revenues to debt,
wNτ
b
=
τ
1−τ
B
Y
.
These relationships are sufficient to define all log-linearized relationships dependent
on model parameters and an initial debt-to-GDP ratio such that the initial steady state
is efficient. We consider the case of an inefficient steady state in Section 6.
2.3 Social Welfare
Appendix A derives the quadratic approximation to utility
 = −N 1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
{
σθ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t )2 + σ (1 − θ )(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t )2
+ϕ(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t )2 +

γ
π2t
}
+ tip + O[2].
It contains quadratic terms in price inflation reflecting the costs of price dispersion
induced by inflation in the presence of nominal inertia, as well as terms in the
consumption, government spending, and output gaps, that is, the difference between
the actual value of the variable and its optimal value. The weights attached to each
element are a function of deep model parameters. The key to obtaining this quadratic
specification, suitable for analyzing the various forms of optimal policy we consider,
lies in adopting an employment subsidy that eliminates the steady-state distortions
caused by imperfect competition in labor and product markets as well as the steady-
state impact of a distortionary income tax. It is important to stress that this subsidy
only applies in the steady state such that it cannot be used as a policy instrument
to either stabilize the economy or the government’s finances in the face of shocks.
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Moreover, as discussed at the beginning of Section 1, alternative, but probably less
familiar, modeling devices can achieve the same objective function without recourse
to such a subsidy.
2.4 Gap Variables
We have derived welfare based on various gaps, so we now proceed to rewrite our
model in terms of the same gap variables to facilitate derivation of optimal policy.
The consumption Euler equation can be written in gap form as
(Ĉt − Ĉ∗t ) = Et {(Ĉt+1 − Ĉ∗t+1)} −
1
σ
((rt − r∗t ) − Et {πt+1}),
where r∗t = σ 1+ϕσ+ϕ (Et {at+1} − at ) is the natural/efficient rate of interest. (This comes
from the fact that Ĉ∗t = Ŷ ∗t and the definition of the efficient level of output.)
While the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) can be written in gap form as
πt = βEtπt+1 + γ
(
ϕ(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t ) + σ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t ) +
τ
1 − τ (̂τt )
)
,
Appendix B rewrites the budget constraint in gap form as
b̂t − πt = βb̂t+1 − βEt {πt+1 + σ (Ĉt+1 − Ĉ∗t+1)} + pst − ft + σβ(Ĉt − Ĉ∗t )
with the primary surplus defined as
pst = wNτb
[
(1 + ϕ)(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t ) +
1
1 − τ (̂τt ) + σ (Ĉt − Ĉ
∗
t )
]
− G
b
(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t ) (14)
and
ft = −(σ (1 − βρa) + (1 − σ )(1 − β)) (1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ at ,
captures the extent to which the technology shocks hitting the economy have fiscal
consequences.
3. PRECOMMITMENT POLICY
In this section, we shall consider the precommitment policies for our model. Since
the economy is cashless, the monetary policymaker is free to adjust interest rates
to achieve a particular level of the consumption gap. Therefore, we can simplify
the problem by treating the consumption gap as the monetary policy instrument
and dropping the consumption Euler equation as an explicit constraint. It should
be noted that by replacing the interest rate with the consumption Euler equation, the
government budget constraint still contains the impact of variations in debt service
costs. The Lagrangian associated with the policy problem under commitment in the
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presence of a government budget constraint is therefore given by
Lc0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βs
[
σθ (cgt )2 + σ (1 − θ )(ggt )2 + ϕ(ygt )2 +

γ
π2t
+ λπt
(
πt − βπt+1 − γ
(
ϕygt + σcgt +
τ
1 − τ τ̂t
)
+ λyt (ygt − (1 − θ )ggt − θcgt )
+ λbt (̂bt − πt − β (̂bt+1 − πt+1 − σcgt+1) +
G
b
ggt
− wNτ
b
[
(1 + ϕ)(ygt ) +
1
1 − τ (̂τt ) + σc
g
t
]
+ ft − σβcgt
)]
,
where λπt , λ
y
t , and λbt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the NKPC, the
resource constraint, and the government’s budget constraint, respectively. To simplify
notation we have rewritten the gap variables in the form, xgt = X̂t − X̂∗t .
3.1 The FOCs for t > 0
The FOCs from optimization for periods t > 0 for cgt , y
g
t , πt , τ̂t , and b̂t+1, respec-
tively, are given by
2σθcgt − γ σλπt − θλyt −
wNτ
b
σλbt − σβλbt + σλbt−1 = 0,
2ϕygt − γ ϕλπt + λyt −
wNτ
b
(1 + ϕ)λbt = 0,
2

γ
πt + λπt − λbt = 0,
− τ
1 − τ γ λ
π
t −
wN
b
τ
1 − τ λ
b
t = 0,
E0λbt − λb0 = 0,
while if government spending is considered to be an instrument of policy, its FOC is
given by
2σ (1 − θ )ggt − (1 − θ )λyt +
G
b
λb0 = 0;
otherwise, in line with much of the existing literature, government spending would
be considered as exogenous.8
8. We consider the case where government spending is not considered to be an instrument of optimal
policy in the online appendix available at http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/70226/.
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The FOC for debt implies that the Lagrange multiplier for debt follows a random
walk and this will underpin the random walk for steady-state debt result derived
later. Combining this FOC with that for inflation and the tax rate implies that in the
absence of new information, inflation is zero. Solving the remaining FOCs implies the
following relationships between the gapped consumption variable and the Lagrange
multiplier associated with debt:
c
g
t = −
(ϕ + σ )( σ−θ(1−θ)
θσ
) − (1 − β) BY
2(ϕ + σ ) BY
λb0 = −a2λb0. (15)
The constancy of the consumption gap implies that monetary policy is set such that
interest rates are consistent with the natural rate of interest.
When government spending is utilized as a policy instrument it will satisfy
ggt = −
(ϕ + σ ) θ
σ
− (1 − β) BY
2(ϕ + σ ) BY
λb0 = −a3λb0, (16)
and the output gap is a linear function of the consumption and government spending
gaps, which in the case when government spending is chosen optimally is given by
ygt = −
(ϕ + σ ) − (1 − β) BY
2(ϕ + σ ) BY
λb0 = −a1λb0. (17)
It is clear from these definitions that the coefficients, ai , i = 1, 2, 3, are positive
provided the initial steady-state debt stock satisfies the following conditions:
(1 − β) B
Y
< (σ + ϕ) θ
σ
, (18)
(1 − β) B
Y
< (ϕ + σ )
(
σ − θ (1 − θ )
θσ
)
,
(1 − β) B
Y
< (σ + ϕ).
For plausible steady-state debt–GDP ratios all variants of this condition will hold,9
implying that when λb0 > 0, y
g
t , c
g
t , and g
g
t will all be negative, which implies that
τ̂t > 0. The converse is true when λb0 < 0. In other words, following a shock that
raises debt, the government will commit to permanently raise taxes and cut spending
to service that debt. This will lead to permanently lower consumption and output, but
the policy mix will ensure that the higher debt level is maintained without generating
any inflation.
9. For the paramater values adopted in the simulation section later, the annualized steady-state debt-
to-GDP ratio would have to exceed 2812.5% for the strongest of these conditions to be violated.
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It is helpful to rewrite the definition of the primary surplus, (14), in terms of the
value of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s budget constraint
by substituting for the tax rule, which applies after the initial period,
pst = yb
[(
τ
1 − τ − ϕ
)
ygt − σcgt − (1 − θ )ggt
]
− ft .
Using the expressions relating the gap variables to the Lagrange multiplier, this can
be rewritten as
pst = λb0 − ft , (19)
where  = ( BY )−1[(ϕ − τ1−τ )a1 + σa2 + (1 − θ )a3] > 0, again for debt not too
large.10
3.2 The FOCs for t = 0
In this subsection, we consider the case where the policymaker exploits the fact that
expectations are given in the initial period. By contrasting the solution in the initial
period to that which follows, we can highlight the nature of the time-inconsistency
problem facing policymakers, which will help generate intuition for the outcome
under discretion. In the initial period the initial values of the Lagrange multipliers
can be set equal to zero as the policymaker is assumed to be formulating a plan to
which they will commit from this point on. This implies the following relationship
for consumption in the initial period,
c
g
0 =
( (ϕ(1 − θ ) + σ )β
2(ϕ + σ ) − a2
)
λb0, (20)
and, when government spending is chosen optimally,
gg0 = −
(
ϕβ
2(ϕ + σ ) + a3
)
λb0, (21)
where λb0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government’s budget con-
straint under optimal (nontimeless) commitment given the information available at
time 0.
Assuming the government spending gap is equal to zero when government spending
is not a policy instrument implies the output gap is proportional to the output gap,
yg0 = (1 − θ )cg0 , while when government spending is chosen optimally we have
yg0 =
(
σβ
2(ϕ + σ ) − a1
)
λb0. (22)
The initial term in each of these expressions captures the extent to which output and
consumption gaps are higher and government spending gaps lower in the initial period
10. For the parameter values adopted in the simulation section later, it is not possible for this coefficient
to be negative for any positive debt-to-GDP ratio.
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as the government attempts to exploit the fact that expectations of the initial period are
already formed. Therefore, in the face of a shock with negative fiscal consequences
we observe higher inflation and relatively higher output and consumption, but lower
government spending in the initial period. This implies that there is a negative interest
rate gap as monetary policy accommodates debt in the initial period. Whether or not
taxes are relatively higher or lower in the initial period is ambiguous. The net effect
of these policies is to raise inflation in the initial period. Given this behavior in the
initial period, the initial government surplus is given by
ps0 = ( + 0)λb0 − f0,
where 0 = (σ+ϕ)(θ(1−θ)−σ )+θσ (1−β)
B
Y
2 BY θ(σ+ϕ)
> 0 provided inequality (18) holds. In other
words there is an attempt to reduce the fiscal consequences of the shock in the initial
period.
3.3 The Time-Inconsistent Response
In order to determine the size of the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
government’s IBC, we need to substitute these expressions in the intertemporal budget
constraint to obtain
b̂0 − π0 − σ (ϕ(1 − θ ) + σ )β
2
2(ϕ + σ ) λ
b
0 =
(
0 + 
β−1 − 1
)
λb0 − E0
∞∑
t=0
β t ft .
Using the expression for the initial rate of inflation and solving for the Lagrange
multiplier yields(
wN
b
+ γ + 0 + 1 − β + σ
(ϕ(1 − θ ) + σ )β2
2(ϕ + σ )
)
λb0 = b̂0 + E0
∞∑
t=0
βs f0.
That is, the Lagrange multiplier is proportional to the sum of the initial debt dise-
quilibrium and the expected discounted value of the fiscal effects of the technology
shocks. However, ceteris paribus, the value of the multiplier will not be as large when
the policymaker exploits fixed expectations in the initial period to raise additional
tax revenue and deflate the debt. This implies that in the case of a shock with a
higher debt stock, output, consumption, and government spending will not fall by as
much, and taxes will not need to rise by as much to support the new steady-state debt
stock, which is lower than it would be under a policy that did not exploit the fact that
expectations are given in the initial period.
As a result of the fact that some of the fiscal consequences of shocks will be undone
in the initial period, the new steady-state debt stock under (nontimeless) commitment
can be shown to be given by
bC =
(

1 − β
)
λb0 < b̂t + E0
∞∑
t=0
β t ft .
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It is important to note that if there was no attempt to behave differently in the initial
period then there would be full accommodation of all the fiscal consequences of
shocks.
We are now in a position to fully describe the response to shocks under commitment.
Shocks only have an effect on welfare-relevant gap variables to the extent that they
have fiscal repercussions, the financing of which limits the extent to which monetary
and fiscal policy can achieve the first-best solution. Under both full and timeless
commitment, inflation beyond the initial period is always zero. Outside of the initial
period, policy allows the fiscal effects of shocks to be fully reflected in the debt stock
and to only adjust fiscal instruments (government spending gaps and the tax gap) to
the extent required to support the new steady-state debt stock. In this sense, optimal
policy fully accommodates the debt shock. Debt will slowly evolve until it reaches
a new steady-state value consistent with higher taxes, lower government spending,
reduced consumption, and output.
The time-inconsistent (nontimeless) optimal commitment policy exploits the
Phillips curve in the initial period by raising inflation, thereby reducing the ulti-
mate increase in debt. The extent to which it does this will depend on whether debt
is real or nominal: the increase in steady-state debt (and associated changes in other
variables) will be less when debt is nominal.
4. DISCRETIONARY POLICY
Following Anderson, Kim, and Yun (2010), we can write the discretionary policy
problem in the form of a Lagrangian:
Ldt = σθ (cgt )2 + σ (1 − θ )(ggt )2 + ϕ(ygt )2 +

γ
π2t + βEt V (̂bt+1, ξt+1)
+ λπt (πt − β(φ1b̂t+1 + δ1at ) − γ
(
ϕygt + σcgt +
τ
1 − τ τ̂t )
)
+ λyt (ygt − (1 − θ )ggt − θcgt )
+ λbt (̂bt − πt − β (̂bt+1 − (φ1b̂t+1 + δ1at ) − σ (φ2b̂t+1 + δ2at ) +
G
b
ggt
− wNτ
b
[
(1 + ϕ)(ygt ) +
1
1 − τ (̂τ
g
t ) + σcgt
]
+ ft − σβcgt ).
The first key differences between discretion and commitment is that under discretion
the policymaker takes expectations as given, although the policymaker recognizes
that expectations will be affected by the current state of the economy. Accordingly,
given our LQ framework, the expectations of future inflation are set equal to a lin-
ear combination of the state variables, Etπt+1 = φ1bt+1 + δ1at , as are consumption
expectations, Et cgt+1 = φ2bt+1 + δ2at , where the parameters φi and δi , i = 1, 2, are
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still to be determined. This implies that the policymaker cannot commit to future
policy actions in order to favorably influence expectations. Instead, they must reop-
timize every period, although that reoptimization will take account of the fact that
both expectations and the future policy payoffs (βEt V (̂bt+1, at )) will be influenced
by the value of any endogenous state variables bequeathed to the future.
The FOCs for this optimization for cgt , y
g
t , πt , τ̂t , and b̂t+1, respectively, are given
by
2σθ (cgt ) − λπt γ σ − θλyt − λbt σ
(
β + wNτ
b
)
= 0,
2ϕ(ygt ) − λπt γ ϕ + λyt −
wNτ
b
(1 + ϕ)λbt = 0,
2

γ
πt + λπt − λbt = 0,
−γ τ
1 − τ λ
π
t −
wNτ
b
1
1 − τ λ
b
t = 0,
β
∂Et V (̂bt+1, ξt+1)
∂bt+1
− βφ1λπt − βλbt (1 − φ1 − σφ2) = 0,
while that for government spending when it is treated as a policy instrument is given
by
2σ (1 − θ )(ggt ) − (1 − θ )λyt +
G
b
λbt = 0.
Conditional on the “guesses” for the expectations equations and the parameteriza-
tion of the value function, we can solve these FOCs and the original constraints to
obtain values for all variables and Lagrange multipliers in terms of the current val-
ues of the states. Contrasting this solution with the original guesses can then verify
whether or not the guess was correct. If it is, then we have found a time-consistent
solution to the policy problem. If not, we must continue to update the guess until it
delivers a solution, which is consistent with the original guess, thereby verifying the
guess. In solving the policy problem under discretion, we employ the computer codes
of Soderlind (1999) who develops an iterative procedure in the manner of Oudiz and
Sachs (1985). This yields a solution to the policy problem, which satisfies both the
expectations formation equations and the definition of the value function.
Before we turn to explore the numerical solution of this system, it is possible to
obtain some further analytical results by partially solving some of the policy instru-
ments as a function of inflation. Doing so casts some light on the optimal assignment
of instruments to the control of inflation versus the stabilization of government debt.
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Accordingly, solving the first four FOCs implies the following relationship between
consumption and inflation:
c
g
t = −
(σ (σ + ϕ − σ+ϕ
σ
θ (1 − θ )) − BY σ (σβ + θ (1 − β) + ϕβ(1 − θ )))ε
(ϕ + σ )σθ ((1 − θ ) + (1 − β) BY + 1 + BY γ )
πt , (23)
while if government spending is chosen optimally
ggt = −
(
θ (ϕ + σ ) + σ (β(1 + ϕ) − 1) BY
)
ε
σ (ϕ + σ )
(
(1 − θ ) + (1 − β) BY + 1 + BY γ
)πt . (24)
Combining this with the definition of output allows us to obtain the following re-
lationship between the output gap and inflation under discretion, when government
spending is chosen optimally (if Gt is set exogenously the output gap under discre-
tion is simply a linear function of the optimal consumption gap and the exogenous
government spending gap, ygt = (1 − θ )cgt + θggt ),
ygt = −
(
(ϕ + σ ) − (1 + β(σ − 1)) BY
)
ε
(ϕ + σ )
(
(1 − θ ) + (1 − β) BY + 1 + BY γ
)πt . (25)
For plausible labor supply parameters, the government spending gap has the opposite
sign to the rate of inflation under discretion, but the signs of the other relationships
depend crucially on the size of the debt stock. For small steady-state debt–GDP
ratios under discretion consumption, and consequently the output gap, will have the
opposite sign to the rate of inflation. Basically, following a shock with negative fiscal
consequences, government spending will fall and taxes will rise in order to stabilize
the debt stock. As tax rates are an element of marginal costs, the tax rise will fuel
inflation. Monetary policy will be tightened in order to control this inflation, and this
will serve to reduce consumption (and output). Although the tightening of monetary
policy will raise debt service costs, the relatively small size of the initial debt stock
ensures that this is not a significant problem.
However, for sufficiently large debt stocks policymakers must recognize the nega-
tive effect of monetary policy on debt service costs. This raises the efficacy of using
monetary policy to stabilize the debt such that, with a sufficiently large steady-state
debt–GDP ratio the output and consumption gaps will move in the same direction as
inflation. In other words, despite the fact that government spending falls, consumption
(and output) will increase as a result of a relaxation of monetary policy needed to sta-
bilize debt. Whether or not taxes increase or decrease, augmenting or offsetting this
inflationary impulse, is ambiguous, but as the steady-state debt–GDP ratio rises the
inflationary consequences of taxation becomes more significant (as at higher levels
of steady-state taxation a marginal increase in tax rates becomes a greater drag on
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labor supply) such that taxes are less likely to be used as a tool to stabilize the debt,
and are more likely to be utilized to control inflation.11
The level of debt at which monetary policy moves from an anti-inflationary stance
to one of fiscal accommodation is given by
B
Y
>
(σ − θ (1 − θ ))(σ + ϕ)
σβ + β(1 − θ )ϕ + (1 − β)θ . (26)
For the parameter values considered below this critical value occurs at an annualized
debt–GDP ratio of only 30.4%.12 Given the simple linear relationship between output
and inflation under discretion it is also possible to assess the relative volatility of the
output gap and inflation in the face of shocks. The relative size of the variances will
be given by
Var(yg)
Var(π ) =
⎛⎝
(
(ϕ + σ ) − (1 + β(σ − 1)) BY
)
ε
(ϕ + σ )((1 − θ ) + (1 − β) BY + 1 + BY γ )
⎞⎠2 . (27)
This implies that the volatility of inflation relative to output increases in the the steady-
state debt–GDP ratio. It is also the case that raising the degree of price flexibility
(raising γ ) will reduce the adjustment of output and government spending relative
to inflation in responding to shocks under discretion, and in the limit as γ → ∞
and prices become flexible, all adjustment is through surprise inflation deflating the
nominal debt stock. These results are confirmed in the numerical analysis later.
5. OPTIMAL POLICY SIMULATIONS
In this section, we outline the response of the model to shocks, and illustrate the
analytical results established earlier. Following the econometric estimates in Leith
and Malley (2005) we adopt the following parameter set, ϕ = 1, σ = 2, μ = 1.2,
 = 6, β = 0.99, and, following Gali (1994), the share of government consumption
in GDP, 1 − θ = 0.25. In our benchmark simulations we assume a degree of price
stickiness of θp = 0.75, which implies that an average contract length of 1 year,
and an initial debt–GDP ratio of 60%. However, we also explore the implications
of alternative assumptions regarding the degree of price stickiness and the initial
steady-state debt stock. The productivity shock follows the following pattern:
at = ρaat−1 + ξt ,
11. The changing balance between fiscal and monetary stabilization of debt under discretion has
echoes of the policies observed under the alternative determinate combinations of simple monetary and
fiscal policy rules (see, e.g., Leeper 1991, Leith and Wren-Lewis 2000, 2006, Leith and von Thadden
2008).
12. A numerical analysis of the contributions of various policy instruments to debt stabilization is
conducted in the following section.
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FIG. 1. Evolution of Debt under Discretion as a Function of Price Stickiness and the Debt–GDP Ratio.
where we adopt a degree of persistence in the productivity shock of ρa = 0.99 as in
Ireland (2004).
5.1 Debt under Commitment and Discretion
We begin by confirming that there typically is no random walk in debt under dis-
cretion. Figure 1 plots contour lines for the coefficient on the lagged value of debt in
the state-space solution under discretion, as a function of the degree of price sticki-
ness and steady-state debt–GDP ratio.13 This confirms that our benchmark solution
is stationary since this coefficient is less than one. It is only at very low levels of the
debt–GDP ratio that this coefficient tends to one. The reason is implicit in the analysis
mentioned above and will be explored in the following section. In essence, at very
low debt–GDP ratios surprise inflation and monetary policy accommodation are less
effective in stabilizing debt so the temptation to use them weakens. Instead, adjust-
ment takes place through fiscal instruments, implying a far more gradual stabilization
of debt.
13. In this particular figure, government spending is considered to be an instrument in the pol-
icy optimization, which relies on monetary and tax policy only. A very similar plot emerges if, in-
stead, government spending is excluded as a policy instrument (see the online appendix available
at:http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/70226/).
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FIG. 2. Response to a Debt Shock under Commitment (C) and Discretion—Endogenous G.
As we increase the size of the debt stock, we find that at relatively modest debt–
GDP ratios the sign on the lagged debt stock in the discretionary solution switches
from being positive to negative, implying a potential overshooting in debt correction,
which will be explored later. This tends to imply greater volatility in the various gap
variables in face of shocks, with negative implications for welfare that we note later.
It also implies that the response to any deviation of debt from its efficient level will
be particularly aggressive under discretion.
This can be seen in Figure 2, which plots the different responses to an unexpected
increase in debt under commitment and discretion in the case where government
spending is used as an instrument in the optimization.14 Commitment allows poli-
cymakers to exploit the fact that expectations are given in the initial period, and we
observe a (small) initial cut in the interest rate gap and government consumption, and
increases in taxes and the output gap. This is an example of our finding that in the
first period the commitment policy moves to reduce the steady-state increase in debt.
This fuels inflation despite the moderating effects of a fall in taxation. As a result,
debt is reduced in the initial period, which allows lower increases in taxation and
lower falls in output, government spending, and consumption than would otherwise
be the case beyond the initial period.
Under discretion we observe that debt returns to its initial (= efficient) level.
This requires a more substantial response for all variables. Our analytical results
demonstrated that the direction of response of variables depends crucially on the
14. The case where government spending is not utilized as an instrument in the fiscal stabilization is
considered in the online appendix available at http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/70226/.
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steady-state debt–GDP ratio. In our simulations our chosen debt–GDP ratio of 60%
constitutes a “high” level of debt when considering the analytical results derived
earlier. This implies that, initially, interest rates are cut. On top of this taxes are also
initially increased and this further fuels inflation in the initial period. This serves to
reduce the debt stock below its steady-state value in the initial period. Since under
discretion governments are performing a period-by-period optimization, this drop in
debt results in incentives to move policy instruments in the opposite direction in the
following period, but with the same basic pattern outlined in the section on discretion
earlier. Instruments then follow a damped cycle until the debt stock has returned to
its initial value.15
The overshooting of debt under discretion is an interesting result, which stems
from the inability of the policymaker to influence expectations except by influencing
the levels of endogenous state variables left to the future. As a result, by overshooting
when reducing debt, the policymaker is able to mitigate the impact on the initial
period’s rate of inflation of a given reduction in real interest rates, since the lower
debt gives rise to expectations of a mild deflation in the next period. Given the New
Keynesian Phillips curve lower inflation expectations in the future reduce current
inflation, ceteris paribus. Therefore, the policymaker manages to reduce debt service
costs at a lower cost of inflation by using debt as a means to influence expectations,
which are otherwise outside their control.
Although Figure 2 highlights the nature of the response to an unexpected increase in
debt, in our model deviations of debt from its efficient level are the result of the fiscal
consequences of the technology shocks introduced in our model.16 Figure 3 details
the paths of key endogenous variables following a positive persistent technology
shock under the two policy regimes. The pattern of the gap variables under both
commitment and discretion are the same as mentioned above. Under commitment
there is an initial decline in debt, and gap variables are then held constant at the
levels consistent with the new higher steady-state level of debt. However, in contrast
to Figure 2, the eventual return of debt to its steady-state value under discretion is
relatively slow. This is a result of the persistence of the technology shock itself, which
renders the efficient level of debt equally persistent such that the discretionary solution
eliminates any deviations of debt from its efficient level very quickly in both cases.
In terms of welfare, the costs of technology shocks under commitment are
0.000173% of steady-state consumption, while under discretion those costs are
42 times higher at 0.0074%. This is despite the fact that the commitment policy
involves a permanent increase in tax and spending distortions in support of a higher
level of government debt, while discretionary policy eliminates such distortions
15. An inefficient initial steady-state would create an additional incentive to drive debt to a lower level
consistent with efficiency, but the burden of adjustment among instruments under discretion would be
similar to that identified here. We consider this case in Section 6.
16. Since in the absence of a need to satisfy the government’s budget constraint, the combination of
monetary and tax policy could offset the deviations from the flex price solution caused by typical economic
shocks such as labor supply, markup, and preference shocks, adding such shocks to our model only matter
for optimal policy to the extent that they have fiscal repercusions.
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FIG. 3. Response to a Persistent Technology Shock under Commitment (C) and Discretion.
rapidly. The relatively small welfare costs of technology shocks under commitment
reflects the fact that such shocks are only costly to the extent that they have fiscal
consequences. Under commitment there is only a very partial offsetting of the fiscal
consequences of the shock—outside of the initial period instruments are adjusted to
service the new debt stock that emerges as a result of the shock, but the adjustment
required to pay the interest on the increase in steady-state debt is relatively small.
In contrast, policy under discretion completely offsets the fiscal consequences of
shocks, which requires greater short-term movement in policy instruments, which
then generates the welfare differences across the two policies.
5.2 Controlling Debt under Discretion
In light of these results it is informative to know which policy instruments bear
the brunt of the adjustment. To do this, we calculate the contribution of tax revenues,
government spending, surprise inflation, and lower debt service costs (but excluding
surprise inflation) to returning debt to its steady-state value following a shock. The
computation of the contribution of each instrument is based on the discounted sum
of the fiscal impact of the respective instruments relative to the discounted value of
the fiscal consequences of the shock, which needs to be offset. These contour lines
are plotted as a function of the steady-state debt–GDP ratio and the degree of price
stickiness, θP .
Figure 4 reveals that it is only at very low debt levels and high degrees of price
stickiness that increased tax revenues play a significant role in returning debt to its
steady-state value. While reductions in government expenditure do not contribute to
fiscal stabilization except at moderate degrees of price stickiness and relatively low
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FIG. 4. Contribution of Policy Instruments to Debt Adjustment under Discretion.
levels of steady-state debt and even then only marginally. The lack of government
spending adjustment as a means of stabilizing debt is interesting. The IMF (2012)
calculates that all of nine major fiscal consolidations currently underway rely heavily
on spending cuts as electorates appear to resist tax increases. Our analysis of optimal
policy under discretion suggests that such an approach is not optimal and that while
there may be some role for tax policy in stabilizing debt, adjusting the government
spending gap is not a feature of optimal policy.
With fiscal instruments making little contribution to debt stabilization under
discretion for plausible levels of debt and price stickiness, the burden of adjustment
must fall on monetary policy. This is confirmed in Figure 4. Here we find that beyond
debt–GDP ratios of 30% monetary policy reduces debt service costs in an attempt
to return the debt to its initial value. As the debt–GDP ratio rises the efficacy of
stabilizing debt in this way increases and it almost single-handedly offsets the fiscal
consequences of the shock as debt–GDP ratios rise to 200%. As prices become more
flexible, the ability of the monetary authorities to engineer a change in real interest
rates is reduced and there is greater reliance on surprise inflation to return debt to its
steady state. Interestingly, the use of reduced debt service costs eventually declines
as prices become increasingly sticky. However this reflects the fact that at high
levels of nominal inertia a relatively modest decline in real interest rates produces a
significant rise in the tax base, which boosts tax revenues (this is evident from the
increasing importance of tax revenues at high levels of price stickiness).
For our central parameter set with price contracts lasting for 1 year (θp = 0.75)
and an annualized debt–GDP ratio of 60%, the relative contributions of taxation and
government spending to the stabilization of debt are 18.38% and 2.93%, respectively.
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Surprise inflation accounts for 7.53% of the required stabilization of debt. However,
by far the greatest mechanism for stabilizing the debt comes from reduced debt
service costs, which accounts of 78.69% of the adjustment.17
6. ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we collect together two exercises that assess the robustness of
our results. We begin by relaxing the assumption that our initial steady state is
efficient. We then turn to consider the robustness of our results across a wider range
of structural model parameters, beyond the debt–GDP ratio and degree of price
stickiness emphasized so far.
6.1 Distorted (Initial) Steady State
Up until now we have assumed that a time-invariant steady-state subsidy was in
place that ensured our initial steady state (which is also the steady state to which we
return under discretion) was efficient. In order to assess the robustness of our results
to this assumption, we now assume that the subsidy was not set at a sufficiently high
level to completely offset the tax and monopolistic competition distortions. That is,
we no longer assume the subsidy is set at the optimal level defined in (13), but that it
is set below that level such that there is a wedge,  = (1−κ)(1−τ ) ( −1 ) > 1, between the
marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of labor supply under flexible
prices,
(Cn)−σ = (N n)ϕ,
such that the steady state under flexible prices is no longer efficient and output will be
suboptimally low. As before, we can define all log-linearized relationships dependent
on model parameters and the initial debt-to-GDP ratio, but where the steady state
around which we log-linearize our sticky-price New Keynesian economy is no longer
the efficient one.
Appendix C derives the quadratic approximation to utility when the initial steady
state is distorted as
 = −N 1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
{
σθ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t − Tt )2 + σ (1 − θ )(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t − Tt )2
+ (1 −  + ϕ)(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t − Tt )2 +
t
γ
π2t
}
+ tip + O[3], (28)
17. The policy implications of using interest rates to control debt are considered in Kirsanova, Leith,
and Wren-Lewis (2007, 2009). To the extent that government debt maturities exceed the single period
considered in this paper, monetary accommodation may be less effective in manipulating the size of the debt
stock.
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where Tt = −11−+ϕ+σ (1 − (σ−1)(1+ϕ)σ+ϕ at ) is the “target” for the gap variables. When
 = 1, this reduces to the welfare measure we derived earlier. Note that in addition to
affecting the “target” variable, the degree of inefficiency, , also affects the relative
weights of consumption, government spending, and output. The targets are time
varying since they depend on the level of technology, but they also reflect the steady-
state inefficiencies, which create a desire on the part of policymakers to permanently
increase consumption and output.
We shall see that when the subsidy is insufficient to render the initial steady
state efficient, the policymaker will face a temptation to reduce debt levels and the
associated costs of distortionary taxation. In fact, they will continue to face such a
temptation until debt levels have been reduced by enough to enable the economy to
achieve its efficient allocation. It is therefore helpful to derive the efficient level of
debt conditional on a given level of subsidy. In other words, since we are assuming
that our subsidy is insufficient to achieve efficiency given our initial debt–GDP ratio
and supporting income tax rate, we can define the tax rate, which ensures that a
given subsidy achieves efficiency. Efficiency requires that  = 1, which implies the
following steady-state tax rate:
τ ∗ = 1 − (1 − χ )
(

 − 1
)
.
Note that in the absence of a subsidy this requires a negative tax rate.
It is also helpful to define the size of the output gap required to mimic the efficient
level of output. From the social planner’s problem the efficient level of output is given
by
Y ∗ = (1 + χ 1σ ) σδ+ϕ ,
while the flexible price steady state is given by
Y n =
(
1 + χ 1σ
) σ
σ+ϕ

− 1
σ+ϕ ,
such that the percentage increase in output relative to the flex price steady state is
given by

1
σ+ϕ − 1.
Note that the targets derived as part of the social welfare derivation imply, for small
distortions, that the efficient steady state is the steady state to which the policymaker
acting under discretion will tend to. However, for larger distortions the targets derived
later will only be a first-order approximation to the efficient steady state.
Figure 5 plots the response to beginning at the inefficient steady state under dis-
cretion and commitment. Under commitment in the initial period there is a mild
attempt to reduce the debt level in the initial period when the commitment policy
is first formulated. However, beyond that the policymaker commits to maintain the
debt level, which requires a suboptimally high tax rate and suboptimally low levels
of output. In contrast, under discretion, the policymaker continues to use their policy
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FIG. 5. Impulse Responses Starting from an Initial Distorted Steady State.
instruments to reduce debt to the level at which the tax rate is reduced by enough that
the economy enters a new steady state, which now replicates the efficient allocation
chosen by the social planner. Again the policy mix used to achieve the desired re-
duction in debt is very similar to that considered earlier when analyzing the response
to shocks, and again it can be shown that this composition will vary depending on
debt levels, sticky prices, and other model parameters in the manner described in
Section 4. Nevertheless, the key point that emerges is that at plausible debt levels
there are very strong incentives for policymakers to undertake policies that would
rapidly reduce debt levels to the level that is consistent with an efficient allocation of
resources, but that they would ideally commit not to do so due to the short-run costs
of achieving this efficient debt level.
6.2 Alternative Parameterizations
While we have systematically varied debt–GDP ratios and the degree of price
stickiness in assessing the robustness of results, our model contains two other central
parameters, which may affect the magnitude of the effects we describe. Therefore, we
assess the implications of adopting alternative values of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, σ = 1, 2, and 3, as well as the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, ϕ = 1, 2, and 3.18 Variations in these parameters do not substantially alter
the key results of this paper.
18. These results are contained in an online appendix, which is available online at http://eprints.
gla.ac.uk/70226/.
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7. QUASI-COMMITMENT
Our results suggest a sharp divergence in the behavior of optimal policy under
discretion compared to commitment. However, in the real world, policy may feature
an imperfect ability to commit to future policy actions that lies somewhere between
the two extremes we have considered so far. In order to assess how much credibility
a policymaker must possess in order to come close to mimicking the optimal policy
under commitment we employ the notion of quasi-commitment. In the case of quasi-
commitment, we nest the cases of both discretion and commitment. Essentially,
following Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), Debertoli and Nunes (2010), and
Himmels and Kirsanova (2013), we allow a policymaker to formulate a commitment
plan, but assume with probability 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 that the government will renege on that
plan. We can think of this as the case where a particular policymaker loses office,
at which point a new policymaker is appointed, who will formulate a new plan, but
again faces an exogenous probability, α, of not being able to implement that plan in
a given period.
When α = 1, this reduces to the problem for the discretionary policymaker con-
sidered earlier, while when α = 0, the policymaker operates under full commitment.
For intermediate values the policymaker faces an infinite horizon policy problem,
but with probability (1 − α) they will be forced to reoptimize in a given period. The
Lagrangian for such a policy problem can be written as
Lqc0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
[
((1 − α)β)t
[
σθ (cgt )2 + σ (1 − θ )(ggt )2 + ϕ(ygt )2 +

γ
π2t
+αβV (bt+1, at ) + λπt
(
πt − (1 − α)βπt+1 − αβ(φ1b̂t+1 + δ1at )
− γ
(
ϕygt + σcgt +
τ
1 − τ τ̂t
))
+ λyt (ygt − (1 − θ )ggt − θcgt )
+ λbt (̂bt − πt − β (̂bt+1 − (1 − α)πt+1 − α(φ1b̂t+1 + δ1at )
− σ (1 − α)cgt+1 − σα(φ2b̂t+1 + δ2at )
+ G
b
ggt −
wNτ
b
(
(1 + ϕ)(ygt ) +
1
1 − τ (̂τ
g
t ) + σcgt
]
+ ft − σβcgt
))]
.
This implies that although the policymaker is making a commitment, they are
factoring into their decision making the knowledge that they may be removed from
office and be unable to implement those promises. Accordingly, they are only able
to make promises to the extent that economic agents expect them to remain in office
to be able to implement those promises. Therefore, their objective function becomes
a weighted average of the discounted value of utility under commitment, and the
payoff function under discretion, while expectations can only be affected through
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policy commitments to the extent that those policies are expected to be implemented.
Otherwise, expectations depend linearly on endogenous states.
The FOCs from optimization for periods t > 0 for cgt , g
g
t , y
g
t , πt , τ̂t , and b̂t+1,
respectively, are given by
2σθcgt − γ σλπt − θλyt −
wNτ
b
σλbt − σβλbt + βσ (1 − α)λbt−1 = 0,
2σ (1 − θ )ggt − (1 − θ )λyt +
G
b
λbt = 0,
2ϕygt − γ ϕλπt + λyt −
wNτ
b
(1 + ϕ)λbt = 0,
2

γ
πt + λπt − λbt + (1 − α)(λbt−1 − λπt−1) = 0,
− τ
1 − τ γ λ
π
t −
wN
b
τ
1 − τ λ
b
t = 0,
αβ
∂V (bt+1, at )
∂bt+1
+ α(βφ1(λπt + λbt ) − σφ2λbt ) + Etλbt − λbt = 0.
These FOCs are very similar to those under commitment, except that the random
walk in the Lagrange multiplier for the government’s budget constraint is no longer
present since debt levels affect both future policy payoffs and expectations to the
extent that the policymaker lacks full commitment. Moreover, the influence of past
Lagrange multipliers, which captures adherence to past promises made under the
commitment plan, are weighted by the probability that the commitment regime re-
mains in place (1 − α). Accordingly, in order to solve this policy problem we can
make an initial guess of both the parameterization of the value function and the pro-
jection equations for expectations of consumption and inflation. Conditional on these
guesses we can solve the policy problem under quasi-commitment, before assessing
whether or not the guesses are correct. If they are not we update our guesses until
they are and we have a quasi-commitment solution, which is consistent with rational
expectations over the probability of the policymaker reneging on the commitments
they have made.19
Figure 6 plots impulse response function (IRF) for debt being 1% above its initial
steady-state value, when the probability of reneging on the policy commitments in any
period is α = 0.2, such that the policymaker’s plan is expected to remain in place for
1.25 years. Within the figure we consider three different types of impulse response.
In type (i) we do not actually observe any reneging on the policy commitments,
19. A matrix algebra representation of the policy problem, which nests that under commitment and
discretion, is given in the online appendix: http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/70226/. The appendix also outlines the
solution algorithm developed by Himmels and Kirsanova (2013), which we employ.
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FIG. 6. Impulse Response under Quasi-Commitment—α = 0.2.
although both the policymaker and economic agents in the economy anticipate doing
so with probability, α = 0.2. Under type (ii) impulse responses we allow for observed
“defaults” in periods 3, 4, 7, and 9. Finally, in type (iii) impulse responses we plot the
ex ante average of IRFs across the draws from the reoptimization distribution. Across
all types of IRF we also plot the cases of discretion and commitment. Within the
type (i) impulse responses, which assume that there is no reneging on commitments,
despite the expectation that there would be, the policy looks quite like that under
commitment, with the key difference that since future promises are expected to
be broken, there is a greater incentive to reduce debt in the first period to reduce
the costs of subsequent reoptimizations. This ongoing risk of reneging on previous
commitments raises inflationary expectations and the policymaker tightens monetary
policy such that ex ante real interest rates are unchanged. However, since the reneging
on commitment is assumed never to be realized in these subplots there are persistent
negative price surprises, which are offset by higher tax rates and lower government
spending, such that debt remains constant for as long as the quasi-commitment plan
remains in place.
Within the type (ii) IRFs we assume there are realized reoptimizations in periods
3, 4, 7, and 9. Within each reoptimization period the policymaker acts to reduce the
inherited debt level before embarking on a new quasi-commitment policy, in much
the same way as the policymaker would do in the initial period of commitment.
Therefore, each period of reoptimization serves to reduce the debt level until debt
disequilibrium is eventually eliminated. Finally, the type (iii) IRF plots the average
response to the debt shock under quasi-commitment with a probability of reneging
of α = 0.2, and we observe a gradual stabilization of debt, which is far slower than
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FIG. 7. Impulse Responses under Quasi-Commitment—α = 0.5.
under discretion, but which is clearly different from the random walk result found
under commitment.
Figure 7 does the same but increases the probability of reneging on previous
commitments to α = 0.5, implying that any plan is only expected to last for 6 months.
As a result in the initial period of the quasi-commitment plan the policymaker comes
close to eliminating the debt overhang in a single period. Under the type (i) IRFs we
assume that there are no further reoptimizations although economic agents expect
there to be so with probability α = 0.5. As before, the quasi-commitment plan in the
absence of reoptimization has features similar to that of the full-commitment policy,
but with the exception that further reoptimizations are expected. Thus, as mentioned
above, in the absence of further reoptimizations, inflationary expectations are high
and interest rates rise in line with those expectations to leave the ex ante real interest
rate unchanged and, therefore, consumption constant. However, in the absence of the
expected reoptimizations price surprises are negative and taxes must be raised (and
government spending cut) to maintain the constant debt levels observed under the
quasi-commitment plan. Such a plan, with suppressed levels of private and public
consumption, is clearly costly in welfare terms. However, it is really a promise that
the government makes in anticipation of default. As the type (ii) IRFs show, as soon as
this commitment is overturned such a perverse policy mix can be abandoned and debt
is quickly stabilized. As the type (iii) IRFs show the average response is to stabilize
debt very quickly and the costly reductions in private and public consumption are
eliminated as soon as the quasi-commitment policy is reoptimized.
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NOTES: Triangles, discretion; crosses, commitment; and the dashed line, quasi-commitment.
The welfare implications of not being able to fully commit to future policy actions
are summarized in Figure 8. The relationship between welfare losses and the prob-
ability of default against policy promises is monotonic and nonlinear, and how one
views the significance of imperfect credibility is a question of interpretation. Since
the costs of technology shocks when policymakers have access to both monetary
and fiscal policy instruments are so small under commitment, measuring any loss
of commitment relative to that base looks significant. For example, a probability of
reoptimization of α = 0.1 (such that policy promises are expected to be kept for
2.5 years) leads to a doubling of the welfare losses relative to the case of fully cred-
ible commitment. However, this is still a long way from the costs observed under
discretion, and the welfare costs under quasi-commitment are only closer to those
under discretion when policy promises are only expected to last for less than 1 year
(approximately α = 0.35).
Another way of assessing the importance of commitment is to look at the half-life
of debt following a shock. That is, following an increase in debt, how long is it
before debt has been reduced by half of that increase? This is reported in Figure 9.
Here we see that the random-walk property of debt under commitment is very quickly
overturned as we increase the probabilities of reneging on policy promises. Moreover,
for any probability of reoptimization α > 0.3, over 50% of the debt reduction occurs
in the first quarter. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the half-life of debt is longer
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FIG. 9. Half-Life of Debt under Quasi-Commitment.
than the expected time until reoptimization for effective policy horizons in excess of
1 year.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the optimal response of government debt to shocks
in a New Keynesian model, where welfare is derived from consumers’ utility. We
analytically derive commitment policy and confirm that steady-state debt would
follow a random walk. However, we show that in the initial period under optimal
commitment, policymakers exploit the fact that expectations are given by trying to
reduce the long-run level of debt. While tax and spending adjustments play a role
in this adjustment, for plausible values of the debt–GDP ratio and price stickiness,
monetary policy through either inflation surprises or reduced debt service costs also
plays a role.
The time inconsistency inherent in commitment policy means that the optimal
(time-consistent) discretionary policy for debt is quite different. The random walk
result, typically, no longer holds, and instead debt returns to its steady-state level. Only
by returning debt to its steady state can the incentive to reduce debt through policy
surprises noted under commitment be eliminated. Analytically, we demonstrate that
exactly how this is achieved depends crucially on the debt–GDP level and the degree
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of price stickiness, although will typically not involve any significant adjustment
of government expenditure in contrast to the composition of fiscal consolidations
currently being undertaken (see IMF 2012). For plausible parameter values, a negative
fiscal shock is likely to be unwound in large part by monetary policy engineering a
reduction in debt service costs. The time-consistent policy is likely to involve a quite
rapid reversal of any fiscal shock. As a result, we show that the welfare consequences
of shocks to debt when policy operates under discretion can be significant, which
in turn implies that welfare analysis under discretion using models that employ the
fiction of lump sum taxes may be incomplete.
Finally, we consider the sustainability of the commitment solution in the context
of a policy of quasi-commitment where the policymaker commits to plan, but
both she and other economic agents realize that plan maybe abandoned with an
exogenous probability α, and a new policymaker draws up a new plan, which the new
policymaker may, in turn, renege on. The analysis of this case suggests that relatively
modest levels of commitment involving a time horizon in excess of 1 year, can
achieve welfare levels closer to those observed under commitment than discretion.
APPENDIX A: POLICY OBJECTIVES
Individual utility in period t is
C1−σt
1 − σ + χ
G1−σt
1 − σ −
N 1+ϕt
1 + ϕ .
Before considering the elements of the utility function we need to note the following
general result relating to second-order approximations:
Yt − Y
Yt
= Ŷt + 12 Ŷ
2
t + O[2],
where Ŷt = ln( YtY ), O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the bound
on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places in the
derivation of welfare. Now consider the second-order approximation to the first term:
C1−σt
1 − σ = C
1−σ
(
Ct − C
C
)
− σ
2
C1−σ
(
Ct − C
C
)2
+ tip + O[2],
where tip represents “terms independent of policy.” Using the results mentioned
above this can be rewritten in terms of hatted variables:
C1−σt
1 − σ = C
1−σ
{
Ĉt + 12(1 − σ )Ĉ
2
t − σ Ĉt
}
+ tip + O[2].
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Similarly for the term in government spending:
χ
G1−σt
1 − σ = χG
1−σ
{
Ĝt + 12(1 − σ )Ĝ
2
t − σ Ĝt
}
+ tip + O[2].
The final term in labor supply can be written as
N 1+ϕt
1 + ϕ = N
1+ϕ
{
N̂t + 12(1 + ϕ)N̂
2
t
}
+ tip + O[2].
Now we need to relate the labor input to output and a measure of price dispersion.
Aggregating the individual firms’ demand for labor yields:
Nt =
(
Yt
At
)∫ 1
0
(
P( j)t
Pt
)−
d j.
It can be shown (see Woodford 2003, chap. 6) that
N̂t = Ŷt − at + ln
[∫ 1
0
(
P( j)t
Pt
)−
d j
]
= Ŷt − at + 2var j {P( j)t } + O[2],
so we can write
N 1+ϕt
1 + ϕ = N
1+ϕ
{
Ŷt + 12(1 + ϕ)Ŷ
2
t − (1 + ϕ)Ŷt at +

2
var j {P( j)t }
}
+ tip + O[2].
Using these expansions, individual utility can be written as
t = C1−σ
{
Ĉt + 12(1 − σ )Ĉ
2
t
}
+ χG1−σ
{
Ĝt + 12(1 − σ )Ĝ
2
t
}
− N 1+ϕ
{
Ŷt + 12(1 + ϕ)Ŷ
2
t − (1 + ϕ)Ŷt at +

2
var j {P( j)t }
}
+ tip + O[2].
Using second-order approximation to the national accounting identity:
θĈt = Ŷt − (1 − θ )Ĝt − 12θĈ
2
t −
1
2
(1 − θ )Ĝ2t +
1
2
Ŷ 2t + O[2].
With the steady-state subsidy in place and government spending chosen optimally,
the following conditions hold in the initial steady state:
C1−σ = N 1+ϕθ,
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and
χG1−σ = N 1+ϕ(1 − θ ),
which allows us to eliminate the levels terms and rewrite welfare as
t = C1−σ
{
−1
2
σ Ĉ2t
}
+ χG1−σ
{
−1
2
σ Ĝ2t
}
− N 1+ϕ
{1
2
ϕŶ 2t − (1 + ϕ)Ŷt at
+ 
2
var j {P( j)t }
}
+ tip + O[2].
We now need to rewrite this in gap form using the FOCs for the social planner to
eliminate the term in the technology shock:
t = −N 1+ϕ 12 {σθ (Ĉt − Ĉ
∗
t )2 + σ (1 − θ )(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t )2 + ϕ(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t )2
+ var j {P( j)t }} + tip + O[2].
Using the result from Woodford (2003) that
∞∑
t=0
β t vari {pt (i)} = θ(1 − θ )(1 − θβ)
∞∑
t=0
β tπ2t + tip + O[2],
we can write the discounted sum of utility as
 = −N 1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
{
σθ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t )2 + σ (1 − θ )(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t )2
+ϕ(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t )2 +

γ
π2t
}
+ tip + O[2].
APPENDIX B: THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT USING GAP VARIABLES
The log-linearized budget constraint is given by
b̂t − πt − σ (Ĉt ) = βb̂t+1 − βEt {πt+1 + σ (Ĉt+1)}
+wNτ
b
(ŵt + N̂t + τ̂t ) − Gb Ĝt − σ (1 − β)(Ĉt ).
Using the labor supply function to eliminate real wages and the definition of efficient
output to eliminate the technology shock:
b̂t − πt − σ (Ĉt ) = βb̂t+1 − βEt {πt+1 + σ (Ĉt+1)} − σ (1 − β)(Ĉt ) − Gb Ĝt
+wNτ
b
((1 + ϕ)(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t ) +
1
1 − τ τ̂t + σ (Ĉt − Ĉ
∗
t ) + Ŷ ∗t ).
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Gapping the remaining variables and combining shock terms,
b̂t − πt − σ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t ) = βb̂t+1 − βEt {πt+1 + σ (Ĉt+1 − Ĉ∗t+1)} − ft
− σ (1 − β)(Ĉt − Ĉ∗t ) −
G
b
(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t )
+ wNτ
b
(
(1 + ϕ)(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t ) +
1
1 − τ (̂τt )
+ σ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t )
)
,
where
ft = −(σ (1 − βρa) + (1 − σ )(1 − β)) (1 + ϕ)
σ + ϕ at ,
captures the fiscal consequences of the technology shocks hitting the economy.
APPENDIX C: DISTORTED STEADY STATE
With the steady-state subsidy in place and government spending chosen optimally,
the following conditions hold in the initial steady state:
C1−σ = N 1+ϕθ,
and
χG1−σ = N 1+ϕ(1 − θ ),
where  = 1 reflects the case where the steady-state subsidy has been chosen to
achieve an efficient steady state, while  > 1 implies that the subsidy has not been
set sufficiently high to offset the distortions due to monopolistic competition and
distortionary taxation, which allows us to combine but not eliminate the levels terms
and rewrite welfare as
t = C1−σ
{
−1
2
σ Ĉ2t
}
+ χG1−σ
{
−1
2
σ Ĝ2t
}
− N 1+ϕ
{
(1 − )Ŷt + 12(1 −  + ϕ)Ŷ
2
t − (1 + ϕ)Ŷt at +

2
var j {P( j)t }
}
+tip + O[2].
We now need to rewrite this in gap form. To do this recall the log-linearized FOCs
for the social planner:
−σ Ĉ∗t = ϕŶ ∗t − (1 + ϕ)at ,
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and
Ĉ∗t = Ĝ∗t ,
where the “*” denotes the efficient level of that variable in the face of shocks. From the
national accounting identity the latter implies, Ĉ∗t = Ĝ∗t = Ŷ ∗t . Using the definition
of the optimal level of output in the face of shocks we can eliminate the cross-term
in the technology shock,
t = C1−σ
{
−1
2
σ Ĉ2t
}
+ χG1−σ
{
−1
2
σ Ĝ2t
}
− N 1+ϕ{(1 − )Ŷt + 12(1 −  + ϕ)Ŷ
2
t − ϕŶ ∗t Ŷt
− σ Ĉ∗t Ŷt +

2
var j {P( j)t }
+ tip + O[2].
This can be factored as
t = −N 1+ϕ 12
{
σθ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t − Tt )2 + σ (1 − θ )(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t − Tt )2
+(1 −  + ϕ)(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t − Tt )2 +

2
var j {P( j)t }
}
+tip + O[2],
where Tt = −11−+ϕ+σ (1 − (σ−1)(1+ϕ)σ+ϕ at ).
Using the result from Woodford (2003) relating the discounted sum of price dis-
persion to quadratic terms in inflation, we can write the discounted sum of utility as
 = −N 1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
β t
{
σθ (Ĉt − Ĉ∗t − Tt )2 + σ (1 − θ )(Ĝt − Ĝ∗t − Tt )2
+(1 −  + ϕ)(Ŷt − Ŷ ∗t − Tt )2 +

γ
π2t
}
+ tip + O[2],
where Tt = −11−+ϕ+σ (1 − (σ−1)(1+ϕ)σ+ϕ at ).
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